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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
Nos. 11-1258 and 11-1307
______
LIBERTY LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
FETTE FORD, INC.;
CAUSEWAY FORD LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
ALL AMERICAN FORD;
BURLINGTON LINCOLN MERCURY SUZUKI;
CHAS S. WINNER d/b/a WINNER FORD;
COUNTRY FORD MERCURY JEEP;
D’AMICO LINCOLN MERCURY, INC.;
DAYTON FORD, INC.; DOWNS FORD, INC.;
FORD OF ENGLEWOOD, INC.;
FREEHOLD FORD, INC.;
GEORGE WALL LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
HILLSIDE AUTO MALL, INC.;
IRWIN LINCOLN-MERCURY;
JACK TREBOUR FORD; KEN SMITH MOTORS, INC.;
LARSON FORD, INC.; LICCARDI FORD, INC.;
LICCARDI LINCOLN MERCURY;
LILLISTON FORD, INC.;
MARGARINO FORD-MERCURY AND DAEWOO, L.L.C.;
MAHWAH SALES & SERVICE, INC.;
MALOUF FORD, INC.;
MALOUF LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
MAPLECREST FORD OF MENHAM;
MAPLECREST LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;

MEDFORD FORD;
MONTCLAIR BLOOMFIELD MOTORS, INC.;
MULLANE FORD, INC.; OASIS FORD;
PALISADE MOTORS, INC. d/b/a C&C FORD, INC.;
PARK AVENUE FORD; PISTILLI FORD, INC.;
POINT PLEASANT FORD;
QUALITY LINCOLN MERCURY HYUNDAI, INC.;
RICKLES LINCOLN-MERCURY, L.L.C.;
RIDGEWOODS VILLAGE FORD, INC.;
RITTENHOUSE-KERR FORD, INC.;
ROUTE 23 AUTOMALL;
SOUTH SHORE FORD, INC.; STADIUM FORD, L.L.C.;
STRAUB LINCOLN-MERCURY; TOM’S FORD;
TOWN AND COUNTRY MOTORS, INC.;
TOWN MOTORS; VALLEY FORD;
WARNOCK FORD; WAYNE AUTO SALES;
WAYNE MOTORS, INC.; WEISLEDER, INC.;
WOODBRIDGE LINCOLN-MERCURY;
WYCKOFF FORD, INC.;
WYMAN FORD, INC., all New Jersey corporations; and
CAPITAL CITY FORD, INC.; ED CARNEY FORD, INC.;
RITTENHOUSE-KERR LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.; and
RIVERVIEW FORD OF PENNSVILLE, INC.,
Delaware corporations,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Appellant No. 11-1258
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ALL AMERICAN FORD;
BURLINGTON LINCOLN MERCURY SUZAK;
CAUSEWAY FORD LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
CFORD, L.L.C.; COUNTRY FORD MERCURY JEEP;
D’AMICO LINCOLN MERCURY, INC.;
DAYTON FORD, INC.; DFFLM, L.L.C.;
DOWNS FORD, INC.; ED CARNEY FORD;
ELITE FORD, INC.; FETTE FORD, INC.;
FORD OF ENGLEWOOD, INC.;
FORD WORLD, L.L.C.; FREEHOLD FORD, INC.;
GEORGE WALL LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
HILLSIDE AUTO MALL, INC.;
IRWIN LINCOLN-MERCURY; JACK TREBOUR FORD;
KEN SMITH MOTORS, INC.; LARSON FORD, INC.;
LIBERTY LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
LICCARDI FORD, INC.;
LICCARDI LINCOLN MERCURY, INC.;
LILLISTON FORD, INC.;
MARGARINO FORD-MERCURY AND DAEWOO, L.L.C.;
MAHWAH SALES & SERVICE, INC.;
MALOUF FORD, INC.;
MALOUF LINCOLN MERCURY, INC.;
MAPLECREST FORD OF MENDHAM;
MAPLECREST LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;
MEDFORD FORD;
MONTCLAIR-BLOOMFIELD MOTORS, INC.;
MULLANE FORD, INC.;
OASIS FORD; PALISADE MOTORS, INC.;
PARK AVENUE FORD; PARKWAY FORD, INC.;
PISTILLI FORD, INC.; PNCLM, L.L.C.;
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POINT PLEASANT FORD;
QUALITY LINCOLN MERCURY HYUNDAI, INC.;
RICKLES LINCOLN-MERCURY, L.L.C.;
RIDGEWOOD VILLAGE FORD, INC.;
RITTENHOUSE-KERR FORD, INC.;
RITTENHOUSE-KERR LINCOLN MERCURY, INC.;
RIVERVIEW FORD OF PENNSVILLE, INC.;
ROUTE 23 AUTO MALL; SOUTH SHORE FORD, INC.;
STADIUM FORD; STATELINE FORD, INC.;
STRAUB LINCOLN-MERCURY; TOM’S FORD;
TOWN & COUNTRY MOTORS, INC.;
TOWN MOTORS; VALLEY FORD;
WARNOCK FORD; WAYNE AUTO SALES;
WAYNE MOTORS, INC.; WEISLEDER, INC.;
CHAS S. WINNER;
WOODBRIDGE LINCOLN-MERCURY;
WYCKOFF FORD, INC.; WYMAN FORD, INC.,
Appellants No. 11-1307
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-02-cv-04146)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
______
Argued January 23, 2012
Before: FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges,
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and JONES, * District Judge.
(Filed: April 09, 2012 )
Paul J. Halasz, Esq.
Dennis LaFiura, Esq.
Day Pitney
One Jefferson Road
Parsippany, NJ 07054-2891
Christopher T. Handman, Esq. (Argued)
Hogan Lovells US
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Columbia Square
Washington, DC 20009-1109
Counsel for Ford Motor Company
Ronald J. Campione, Esq.
Eric L. Chase, Esq. (Argued)
Stephen R. Knox, Esq.
Genevieve K. LaRobardier, Esq.
Bressler, Amery & Ross
325 Columbia Turnpike
P.O. Box 1980
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Counsel for Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc.
*

The Honorable John E. Jones, III, District Judge for
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”) appeals the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty LincolnMercury, Inc., Lilliston Ford, Oasis Ford, and Warnock Ford
(collectively, “Dealers” or “Franchisees”) on the ground that
Ford’s New Jersey Cost Surcharge (“NJCS”) violates the
New Jersey Franchise Protection Act (“NJFPA”). The
Franchisees cross-appeal the District Court’s denial of their
motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages and
denial of their application for a 12% pre-judgment interest
rate. They also cross-appeal the District Court’s denial of
their motion for summary judgment and grant of Ford’s
motion for summary judgment on certain engine and
transmission reimbursement claims.
For the reasons
discussed below, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the
District Court’s orders.
I. Background and Procedural History
Ford manufactures vehicles and sells them through a
nationwide network of independent franchise dealers. The
dealers purchase vehicles from Ford at wholesale prices and
resell them at retail prices. With each new vehicle sold, Ford
provides a basic manufacturer’s warranty that entitles the
customer to have Ford repair or replace certain defective
vehicle components. Customers can bring their vehicles to
6

any Ford dealer, regardless of where they purchased the
vehicles, and obtain warranty service free of charge. Ford
then reimburses the dealers for their labor and parts used.
Since 1994, Ford has provided dealers a mark-up of 40% over
cost for most parts used in warranty services – this means that
Ford pays the dealer, in total, 140% of the cost of those parts.
However, under the New Jersey Franchise Protection Act
(“NJFPA”), Ford must reimburse dealers for warranty parts at
the “prevailing retail rate,” which is the rate dealers charge
retail customers in connection with non-warranty work. N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a). As a result, New Jersey dealers are
reimbursed at higher rates than their counterparts in other
states.
In 1991, Ford implemented a Dealer Parity Surcharge
(“DPS”) in order to recoup the increased cost of reimbursing
New Jersey dealers under the NJFPA. Under the DPS, Ford
calculated, for each New Jersey dealer, the cost of increased
warranty reimbursements due to the higher retail
reimbursement rate, and then divided that total by the number
of wholesale vehicles purchased by that same dealer. That
amount constituted the surcharge added to the wholesale price
of every vehicle purchased by that specific dealer.
Consequently, the wholesale vehicle surcharge a dealer faced
would increase in direct proportion to the amount of warranty
claims the dealer submitted.
In 1992 and 1995, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. and
other franchise dealers filed suit against Ford, contending that
the DPS was unlawful. The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey dismissed the 1992 lawsuit without
prejudice but granted summary judgment for the dealers in
7

the 1995 lawsuit on the grounds that the DPS violated the
NJFPA. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
(Liberty I), 923 F. Supp. 665, 667-70 (D.N.J. 1996). In
affirming the district court’s order, we recognized that the
NJFPA did “not preclude cost-recovery systems effected
through wholesale vehicle price increases, but reject[ed]
Ford’s contention that the DPS constitute[d] such a system.”
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Liberty II),
134 F.3d 557, 564 (3d Cir. 1998). The DPS, which accrued
in direct proportion to the amount of warranty reimbursement
submitted by each New Jersey dealer, “did not function as a
wholesale price increase effected through vehicle sales
transactions[.]” Id. at 565. Instead, it “automatically
reduc[ed the franchisees’] reimbursements to below-retail
rates, violat[ing] the NJFPA’s clear mandate that the
franchisor ‘shall reimburse’ the franchisee for warranty parts
‘in an amount equal to the prevailing retail price.’” Id. (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a)).
Subsequently, Ford ceased assessing the DPS and
devised a new cost-recovery system, termed the New Jersey
Cost Surcharge (“NJCS”). Under the NJCS, Ford calculated
its total cost of complying with the NJFPA across all New
Jersey dealers and divided that cost by the total number of
wholesale vehicles sold in the State. This resulted in a flat
surcharge for every wholesale vehicle sold in the State, rather
than a surcharge that varied across dealers. Thus, a dealer’s
total NJCS increased in proportion to the number of vehicles
the dealer purchased, regardless of how many warranty
repairs the dealer submitted to Ford.
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In 2002, shortly after the NJCS took effect, a group of
New Jersey Dealers filed a complaint alleging that the NJCS
violated, among other laws, the NJFPA. The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Dealers on the
issue of liability. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co. (Liberty III), No. 02-4146(WGB), 2006 WL
1098178, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006). 1 However, the
District Court rejected the Dealers’ argument that they were
entitled, as a matter of law, to full reimbursement of the
surcharge without proving actual damages. Accordingly, it
denied the Dealers’ motion for summary judgment on the
issue of damages as well as their application for a 12% prejudgment interest rate under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-13.5.
The District Court also denied the Dealers’ motion for
summary judgment and granted Ford’s motion for summary
judgment on certain engine and transmission assembly
reimbursement claims.
Because the District Court established that the Dealers
must prove actual damages for the NJFPA violation, four of
the sixty-five plaintiffs proceeded to a jury trial. The jury
awarded the full amount of damages requested by each of the
Dealers. Ford filed a timely appeal on the issue of liability
under the NJFPA. The Dealers filed a timely cross-appeal on
the issue of damages and application for a 12% pre-judgment
1

Following this ruling, the District Court preliminarily
enjoined Ford from imposing the NJCS, but we vacated the
injunction because the Dealers failed to show irreparable
injury. See Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
(Liberty IV), 562 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2009).
9

interest rate, as well as the engine and transmission assembly
reimbursement claims.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1337, and 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction over
the District Court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“Review of a district court’s decision to grant a motion
for summary judgment is plenary.” Horn v. Thoratec Corp.,
376 F.3d 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Horn,
376 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). We must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is
entitled to “all reasonable inferences from the record.” Horn,
376 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s conclusions of law. In re
Tower Air, Inc., 397 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
III. Discussion
A.

The New Jersey Franchise Protection Act

The NJFPA provides that:
“The motor vehicle franchisor shall reimburse
each motor vehicle franchisee for such
[warranty] services as are rendered and for such
parts as are supplied, in an amount equal to the
10

prevailing retail price charged by such motor
vehicle franchisee for such services and parts in
circumstances where such services are rendered
or such parts supplied other than pursuant to
warranty; provided that such motor vehicle
franchisee’s prevailing retail price is not
unreasonable when compared with that of the
holders of motor vehicle franchises from the
same motor vehicle franchisor for identical
merchandise or services in the geographic area
in which the motor vehicle franchisee is
engaged in business.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a). Ford appeals the District
Court’s holding that the NJCS violates the express language
of the statute and frustrates its legislative purpose. We review
the District Court’s interpretation of the NJFPA de novo and
construe the statute as we believe the New Jersey Supreme
Court would construe it. Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 563. “As a
general rule of statutory construction, we look first to the
language of the statute.
If the statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face and admits of only one
interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act’s literal
terms to divine the Legislature’s intent.” First Resolution Inv.
Corp. v. Seker, 795 A.2d 868, 873 (N.J. 2002) (citation
omitted). When the language of the statute is ambiguous,
courts may look to the statute’s history, policy, purpose, and
other extrinsic aids to ascertain statutory intent. See Cedar
Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 584 A.2d 784, 788-89 (N.J. 1991).
Consistent with this Court’s reasoning in Liberty II,
134 F.3d at 564-65, we conclude that Ford’s assessment of
11

the NJCS does not violate the clear text of the NJFPA. 2 The
Liberty II Court stated that in general, Ford was permitted to
recover its cost of complying with the NJFPA. Id. at 564. It
drew a distinction, however, between permissible and
impermissible cost-recovery systems. Id. at 564-65.
When determining whether Ford’s DPS was a
permissible cost-recovery system, the Liberty II Court looked
to our sister circuit’s interpretation of a similar Maine statute
in Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Acadia), 44 F.3d
1050 (1st Cir. 1995), superceded by statute, Me. Rev. Stat. tit.
10 § 1176, as recognized in Alliance of Auto. Mfrs v.
Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005). See Neptune T.V. &
Appliance Serv. Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods.
Div., Litton Sys., Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1983) (holding when no state court has construed
the relevant statutory language, New Jersey courts look to
cases construing similar statutes in other jurisdictions). The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
the text of the Maine statute clearly permitted wholesale price
increases because the statute “sa[id] nothing about wholesale
or retail prices, and apparently l[eft] the manufacturer free to
increase wholesale prices, and the dealer to increase retail
prices.” Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1056. Thus, the Maine statute
2

The parties disagree as to whether this Court’s
reasoning in Liberty II, 134 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1998), is
binding precedent or dicta. We find it unnecessary to resolve
this dispute because we agree with the Court’s thorough
reasoning in Liberty II and our holding today is consistent
with the same.
12

regulated warranty reimbursements, but not wholesale or
retail vehicle transactions. See Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 564
(interpreting Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1056).
Under this interpretation, Ford’s warranty parity
surcharge (“WPS”) in Acadia was a bona fide wholesale price
term beyond the realm of statutory regulation because the
WPS imposed a flat surcharge on all wholesale vehicle prices.
Id. It accrued in proportion to the number of vehicles a dealer
purchased, regardless of the amount of warranty
reimbursement claims submitted. Id. The Liberty II Court
found that, in contrast to the WPS, the DPS in New Jersey
accrued in direct proportion to the amount of warranty
reimbursement claims submitted by each dealer, and thus,
was not a bona fide wholesale price term. Id. at 564-65.
Rather, it “automatically reduc[ed the Dealers’]
reimbursements to below-retail rates, violat[ing] the NJFPA’s
clear mandate that the franchisor ‘shall reimburse’ the
franchisee for warranty parts ‘in an amount equal to the
prevailing retail price.’” Id. at 565 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 56:10-15(a)).
Consistent with our interpretation of Acadia in Liberty
II, we hold that the text of the NJFPA clearly permits costrecovery systems using bona fide wholesale price increases.
Like the Maine statute in Acadia, the NJFPA regulates
warranty reimbursements but does not impose limitations on
wholesale vehicle transactions. Thus, reading “a restriction
against wholesale price increases” into the statute “would
improperly establish ‘a rule unsupported by state statute.’”
Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 564 (quoting Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1057).
And like the WPS at issue in Acadia, the NJCS is a bona fide
13

wholesale price increase. It is a flat surcharge assessed on all
wholesale vehicles sold within the State, so the surcharge that
each Dealer pays depends on the number of wholesale
vehicles purchased, regardless of the amount of warranty
claims submitted by each Dealer. 3 Therefore, it is not subject
to regulation under the NJFPA.
Because the statute is clear, we do not need to venture
beyond its text to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. First
Resolution Inv. Corp., 795 A.2d at 873 (citation omitted).
But we elect to address the Dealers’ contention that there is
no real difference between the DPS struck down in Liberty II
and the NJCS we uphold today because both contravene the
statute’s remedial purpose to “equalize the disparity of
bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations.” Liberty
3

The Dealers suggest that the NJCS is not a true
wholesale price increase because the price increase is not
built into the suggested retail price (or sticker price), but
assessed only as a surcharge to the base wholesale price.
However, nothing in the NJFPA, which does not regulate
retail or wholesale transactions, requires the suggested retail
price to reflect all increases in the wholesale price. Thus, we
have no authority to impose such a restriction that is
unsupported by the statute. See Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 44 F.3d 1050, 1057 (1st Cir. 1995), superceded by
statute, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10 § 1176, as recognized in
Alliance of Auto. Mfrs v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that Maine’s statute, which remained silent as
to wholesale transactions, did not require Ford to increase its
sticker price to reflect all increases in the wholesale price).
14

II, 134 F.3d at 566 (citations omitted). In Liberty II, we held
that the DPS violated the text and remedial legislative intent
of the NJFPA because dealers had no choice but to bear the
full cost of the retail-rate warranty reimbursements. Id. at
565 n.6. Under the standard franchise agreement, dealers
“must perform all warranty repairs brought to [their]
dealership[s] and cannot charge customers for those
repairs[.]” Id. Thus, they “cannot control the volume, timing
or profitability of those repairs.” Id. Accordingly, they were
unable to mitigate the increased cost imposed by the DPS,
which depended entirely on the amount of warranty work
performed. Id. However, the NJCS does not impose this
hardship because the surcharge depends on the number of
wholesale vehicles Dealers choose to purchase from Ford,
and Dealers are able to control the volume, timing, and
profitability of the vehicles they purchase.
We recognize that after the Acadia Court upheld
Ford’s WPS, the Maine Legislature amended the warranty
reimbursement statute to expressly prohibit a manufacturer
from “recover[ing] its cost for reimbursing a franchisee for
parts and labor[.]” Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1176. However,
contrary to the District Court’s contention, see Liberty III,
2006 WL 1098178, at *3 n.6, this does not mean that the
Acadia Court misconstrued the Maine statute. Rather, the
Maine Legislature’s subsequent amendment to the statute
indicates that legislatures are capable of speaking clearly to
prohibit franchisors from recovering compliance costs when
that is the legislature’s intention. See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10
§ 1176; see also Fla. Stat. § 320.696(6) (categorically
prohibiting cost recovery); Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1571(B)(5)
15

(same); W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-8a(3) (same). But where, as
here, the statute does not limit such cost recovery schemes,
we cannot impose additional restrictions unsupported by the
clear language of the statute. 4
B.

Engine and Transmission Assembly Claims

Dealers 5 submit that the District Court erred in
denying their motion for summary judgment and granting
Ford’s motion for summary judgment on certain engine and
transmission assembly reimbursement claims. A separate
provision of the NJFPA governs engine and transmission
repairs, 6 recognizing that manufacturers often provide these

4

Because we hold that Ford’s assessment of the NJCS
does not violate the NJFPA, we need not reach the merits of
the Dealers’ cross-appeal on the issue of damages and the
12% pre-judgment interest rate.
5

Of the five plaintiffs cross-appealing the District
Court’s decision, only Liberty Lincoln-Mercury and Oasis
Ford are maintaining their engine and transmission assembly
claims.
6

The relevant provision of the statute reads:
16

expensive parts to their dealers on an as-needed basis, rather
than requiring the dealers to keep them in stock. When the
manufacturer follows that procedure in connection with a
warranty service, the NJFPA does not require full retail
reimbursement; instead, it requires the franchisor to
reimburse the franchisee at 30% of the part’s wholesale price.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(e). Dealers claim that Ford failed
“If a motor vehicle franchisor supplies a part or
parts for use in a repair rendered under a
warranty other than by sale of that part or parts
to the motor vehicle franchisee, the motor
vehicle franchisee shall be entitled to
compensation equivalent to the motor vehicle
franchisee’s average percentage markup on the
part or parts, as if the part or parts had been sold
to the motor vehicle franchisee by the motor
vehicle franchisor. The requirements of this
section shall not apply to entire engine
assemblies and entire transmission assemblies.
In the case of those assemblies, the motor
vehicle franchisor shall reimburse the motor
vehicle franchisee in the amount of 30% of
what the motor vehicle franchisee would have
paid the motor vehicle franchisor for the
assembly if the assembly had not been supplied
by the franchisor other than by the sale of that
assembly to the motor vehicle franchisee.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(e).
17

to reimburse them for certain engine and transmission
assembly repairs.
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was
proper for two reasons. First, the claims were procedurally
barred because the Dealers failed to properly plead them. The
well-established notice pleading standard under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that “the complaint . . . ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Thomas v. Independence
Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 295 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In their complaint, the
Dealers stated that “Ford has refused to reimburse dealers at
retail for engine and transmission assemblies.” Second
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at 13,
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 WL
1098178 (D.N.J. March 31, 2006) (No. 02-4146) (emphasis
added). And Ford settled with the Dealers on these claims of
underpayment. However, like the District Court, we cannot
find any language in the complaint that alleges Ford’s
complete failure to pay any amount for certain engine and
transmission assemblies. Because the complaint failed to
provide notice to Ford regarding its alleged failure to
reimburse the Dealers for these repairs, the District Court
properly granted summary judgment.
The Dealers submit that even if Ford’s alleged
complete failure to pay were not raised in the pleadings, these
claims, raised in the motion for summary judgment, should be
“treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings” because
the issue was “tried by the parties’ express or implied
consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Assuming, without
18

holding, that Rule 15(b) applies at the summary judgment
stage, 7 the Dealers still failed to prove that Ford expressly or
impliedly consented to try the engine and transmission
assembly claims. Because there is no evidence of Ford’s
express consent, the Dealers contend that Ford impliedly
consented to try the claims. A finding of implied consent
depends on three factors: “whether the parties recognized
that the unpleaded issue entered the case at trial, whether the
evidence that supports the unpleaded issue was introduced at
trial without objection, and whether a finding of trial by
7

Courts of Appeals for the D.C., Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have concluded that Rule 15(b), captioned
“Amendments During and After Trial,” may not apply to pretrial motions because the Rule is designed to address
discrepancies between pleadings and evidence introduced at
trial. See Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126
F.3d 339, 344 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Gould, 56
F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
However, other circuits have applied Rule 15(b) at the
summary judgment stage. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202
F.3d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 2000); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach
Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v.
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992);
Walton v. Jennings Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 875 F.2d 1317, 1320
n.3 (7th Cir. 1989); Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d
1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987). We decline to address the issue
today because resolution of it is unnecessary to the
disposition of this case.
19

consent prejudiced the opposing party’s opportunity to
respond.” Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d Cir.
1995) (quoting Portis v. First Nat’l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 332
(5th Cir. 1994)).
First, there is no evidence the parties recognized that
the engine and transmission claims for nonpayment entered
into the litigation.
The complaint never alleged the
nonpayment claims, and none of the court proceedings clearly
referenced the claims. Thus, the parties never had an
opportunity to recognize the nonpayment claims.
Under the second factor, there is “implied consent to
litigate an issue if there is no objection to the introduction of
evidence on the unpleaded issue, as long as the non-objecting
party was fairly apprised that the evidence went to the
unpleaded issue.” Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1294
n.6 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). But the documents
presented by the Dealers here consistently refer to the claim
that Ford under-reimbursed for the repairs, rather than the
claim that Ford failed to reimburse at all. For example, the
District Court’s September 28, 2007 Order denying summary
judgment on the engine and transmission claims and
permitting further discovery stated “Plaintiffs assert, on
information and belief, that Ford failed to reimburse dealer at
the 30% retail rate.” Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 02-4146, 2007 WL 2892943, at *2 (D.N.J.
Sept. 28, 2007) (emphasis added). Discovery requests
submitted by Ford also referred to claims of underreimbursement, rather than nonpayment. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Company’s Fourth Request for Production of
Documents to Plaintiffs at 5 Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v.
20

Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 2892943, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 28,
2007) (No. 02-4146) (requesting “[a]ll documents relating to
any warranty repair involving a vehicle engine and/or
transmission performed by Plaintiff, which Plaintiff contends
Ford has under reimbursed Plaintiff”). In addition, when
Ford’s counsel acknowledged a potential settlement of the
claims during the January 25, 2010 hearing, counsel was
specifically referring to instances where Ford “didn’t pay [the
reimbursement rate] at 30 percent.”
Transcript of
Proceedings at 36, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 2010 WL 624877 (D.N.J. January 25, 2010) (No.
02-4146). Even if some language in the record may be broad
enough to cover both the nonpayment and underreimbursement claims, there is no implied consent where, as
here, “evidence relevant to the new claim is also relevant to
the claim originally pled, because the defendant does not have
any notice that the implied claim was being tried.” Douglas,
50 F.3d at 1236 (citations omitted). Thus, based on the
record, we cannot say that Ford was “fairly apprised that the
evidence went to the unpleaded issue” regarding nonpayment.
Francois, 599 F.2d at 1294 n.6.
Finally, the addition of a new claim after eight years of
litigation and one week before the trial would have prejudiced
Ford by requiring it to conduct substantial additional
discovery when much of the relevant evidence was likely lost.
See Douglas, 50 F.3d at 1236 (finding prejudice when district
court permitted plaintiff to assert new theory of liability “at
such a late stage in the proceedings,” without defendant
“having had the opportunity to defend against this new
claim”). Therefore, we cannot hold that Ford impliedly
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consented to try the engine and transmission nonpayment
claims.
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was
also proper because the Dealers’ failure to submit any written
payment claims to Ford barred these engine and transmission
nonpayment claims. The Dealers argue that written claims
were unnecessary because Ford’s supplying of replacement
engine and transmission parts to them at no cost provided
adequate notice and Ford should have automatically provided
the 30% reimbursement. We reject this argument because
under the NJFPA, the franchisor may require the franchisees
seeking warranty reimbursement claims to “reasonably
substantiate the claim in accordance with reasonable written
requirements of the motor vehicle franchisor, provided that
the motor vehicle franchisee had been notified of the
requirements prior to the time the claim arose and the
requirements were in effect at the time the claim arose.” N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(f). Thus, Ford had the authority to
require the Dealers to file written claims, and it did so under
its Sales and Service Agreement. The Agreement, which
governs the relationship between Ford and its franchisees,
unambiguously states that the “Dealer shall submit claims to
the Company for reimbursement for the parts and labor used
in performing warranty [repairs.] . . . The Dealer shall
maintain adequate records and documents supporting such
claims in accordance with the provisions of the Warranty
Manual.” Joint App. at 148. Ford’s Warranty Manual for the
past ten years consistently indicated that written payment
claims were required for reimbursement. See Decl. of Allen
Taber, Ford Motor Co. Supervisor of Reimbursement Policy
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within the Global Warranty Analysis and Admin. Dep’t at
¶ 3, 7, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No.
02-4146, (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2010). Given that the Dealers
were adequately notified of the written claims requirement
but failed to satisfy the procedure, the District Court properly
granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s orders
will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. We hold that
(1) the New Jersey Cost Surcharge does not violate the New
Jersey Franchise Protection Act; and (2) Ford was entitled to
summary judgment on the engine and transmission assembly
reimbursement claims.
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